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CLOSING THE DATA GAP: PROTECTING 
BIOMETRIC INFORMATION UNDER THE 
BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT 




Between May and June of 2014, Stacy Rosenbach bought her 
son, Alexander, a Six Flags season pass online.1  She submitted 
Alexander’s personal information and read that Alexander would 
complete the sign-up process at the park.2  No details described 
what the sign-up process would entail.3 
After showing his online receipt at Six Flags, Alexander was 
brought to an office to provide the customary thumb scan.4  Alex-
ander’s thumb scan, along with the season pass card, was 
required to permit him to enter the various rides.5  He was not 
given any information about how his thumb scan would be stored 
or used after his season pass expired.6  Alexander—a fourteen-
year-old boy—thought nothing of this process and voluntarily 
gave Six Flags his thumb scan.7 
Mrs. Rosenbach, on the other hand, was shocked to learn of 
this scan when Alexander returned home.8  After Mrs. Rosenbach 
asked Alexander for the paperwork from the season pass, he told 
her Six Flags “did ‘it all by fingerprint now.’ ”9  Although Alex-
ander never returned to Six Flags, Six Flags kept his biometric 
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2021, St. John’s Univer-
sity School of Law; M.A., 2015, Columbia University; B.A., 2014, The Catholic Uni-
versity of America. 
1 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 5. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
4 Id. ¶ 6. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. ¶ 8. 
7 Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
8 Id. ¶ 8. 
9 Id. ¶ 7. 
870 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:869   
information.10  Curiously, Six Flags has not revealed how long it 
planned to keep Alexander’s thumb scan or how it planned to use 
it.11 
Despite their concerns, the Rosenbachs were protected by the 
country’s strongest biometric information privacy law.12  In 2009, 
Illinois was the first state to regulate certain uses of “biometric 
information” and “biometric identifier[s]” with the Biometric 
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).13  Under BIPA, “a retina or iris 
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry” 
are biometric identifiers.14  BIPA defines biometric information 
as “any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, 
stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier 
used to identify an individual.”15  A thumb scan, like the one Six 
Flags took of Alexander, is therefore a biometric identifier, and 
its codified and stored counterpart is biometric information. 
Concerns of indiscriminate use of collected biometric infor-
mation during the Pay By Touch bankruptcy prompted BIPA’s 
enactment in 2008.16  At the time, Pay By Touch “operat[ed] the 
largest fingerprint scan system in Illinois.”17  Its pilot program 
promised to make payment more efficient by linking financial 
information like “credit cards, bank accounts, [and] rewards 
programs” to biometric information.18  Millions of Illinoisans 
 
10 Id. ¶ 9. 
11 Id. 
12 Kathryn Leicht, The Future of Biometric Data Privacy Law and BIPA, N.Y.U. 
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L.: THE BLOG (Mar. 7, 2019), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu 
/2019/03/the-future-of-biometric-data-privacy-law-and-bipa/ [https://perma.cc/BMM4-
AJ23]. 
13 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10 (West 2010). 
14 Id. The statute lists a variety of exceptions to the biometric identifier defini-
tion including  
writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological samples 
used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo 
descriptions, . . . physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, or 
eye color[,] . . . donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the Illinois 
Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or 
potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or 
stored by a federally designated organ procurement agency. 
Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Annemaria Duran, Understanding The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy 
Act & Its Relation to Employers, SWIPECLOCK, (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www3.swipeclock 
.com/blog/understanding-illinois-biometric-information-privacy-act-relation-employers/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8AR-3S8J]. 
17 Charles N. Insler, Understanding the Biometric Information Privacy Act Liti-
gation Explosion, ILL. BAR J., Mar. 2018, at 34, 35. 
18 Duran, supra note 16. 
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signed up and used Pay By Touch in cooperating “grocery stores, 
gas stations, and school cafeterias.”19  When Pay By Touch de-
clared bankruptcy in 2008, many were concerned that their 
biometric information would be sold as assets of the bankrupt 
company20 because no federal laws protected individuals’ 
biometric information from being commodified for financial use.21 
To address these fears, the Illinois Legislature enacted 
BIPA.22  BIPA requires individuals (1) to receive notice of the col-
lection or storage of biometric information or identifiers, (2) to 
receive notice of the purpose and time span of such collection or 
storage, and (3) to give written consent to the process.23 
Not only did BIPA protect Alexander’s thumb scan, but it 
also provided the Rosenbachs with a private cause of action for 
any statutory violations by Six Flags.24  BIPA required notice, 
oversight, and regulation of the collected personal information.25 
Since Six Flags did not provide Alexander with the required 
information during his sign-up process, Stacy Rosenbach—acting 
as mother and legal representative of Alexander—filed a BIPA 
claim against Six Flags Entertainment Corporation in the circuit 
court of Lake County, seeking redress for Alexander and other 
similarly situated persons.26 
While Rosenbach moved through the Illinois court system, 
California spearheaded the country’s “most comprehensive” bio-
metric information law.27  The California Consumer Privacy Act 
(“CCPA”) provided a new gloss on BIPA when it went into effect 
on January 1, 2020.28  Although fifteen states proposed similar 
laws, many observers expected CCPA to act as the new national 
 
19 Id.; Insler, supra note 17. 
20 Insler, supra note 17. 
21 Biometric Security Poses Huge Privacy Risks, SCI. AM. (Jan. 1, 2014), https:// 
www.scientificamerican.com/article/biometric-security-poses-huge-privacy-risks/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TZU9-UCF9].  
22 Duran, supra note 16. 
23 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(b)(1)–(b)(3) (West 2010). 
24 Leicht, supra note 12.  
25 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 2 (2011). 
26 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 1, 10. 
27 Stuart D. Levi & Daniel Healow, California Consumer Privacy Act: A 
Compliance Guide, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES 
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/03/california-
consumer-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/GJ9S-Z8RA]. 
28 Id.; Jeremy Kirk, California’s New Privacy Law: It’s Almost GDPR in the U.S., 
BANK INFO SEC. (July 2, 2018), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/californias-new-
privacy-law-its-almost-gdpr-in-us-a-11149 [https://perma.cc/VF26-VMJA]. 
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baseline for biometric information privacy, given California’s size 
and its economic importance.29  Most tech companies are based in 
Silicon Valley,30 and few companies were expected to maintain 
separate frameworks for each state’s regulations.31  Those famil-
iar with the industry predicted that companies affected by the 
new regulation would provide CCPA-level protection to “all their 
U.S. customers,” but instead most companies have opted to afford 
CCPA’s broad protections only to Californians.32  To achieve the 
desired nationwide level of protection, individual states must 
therefore continue to move ahead with their own laws. 
CCPA grants consumers “more information [about] and con-
trol over” their biometric information through the right to 
general disclosure, specific requests for information, deletion, 
and “equal service and pricing.”33  Violations give rise to standing 
for “consumers.”34  Given the hefty fines imposed for violating the 
statute, businesses will likely interpret “consumers” broadly to 
avoid inadvertent violations.35 
Similar to BIPA, the CCPA arose out of public concern about 
the new almost “limitless natural deposit” of personal 
information collected and refined for a valuable profit-driven 
 
29 See Zack Whittaker, Silicon Valley Is Terrified of California’s Privacy Law. 
Good, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 19, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09 
/19/silicon-valley-terrified-california-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/A45F-U9NC]. Ha-
waii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and even Puerto Rico 
proposed bills similar to CCPA. George P. Slefo, Bracing for Sweeping New Data 
Privacy Law, ADAGE (Oct. 14, 2019), https://adage.com/article/news/how-brands-are-
preparing-californias-privacy-act-becomes-reality-2020/2205586 (subscription required). 
Twenty seven states are developing new privacy laws, although not all of them are 
similar to CCPA. See id.; see also Juliana De Groot, What Is the California Consumer 
Privacy Act?, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (July 15, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com 
/blog/what-california-data-privacy-protection-act [https://perma.cc/3LZ6-RM6H]. See 
generally Levi & Healow, supra note 27.  
30 Slefo, supra note 29. 
31 Id. 
32 Patience Haggin, Businesses Across the Board Scramble To Comply with Califor-
nia Data-Privacy Law, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/businesses-across-the-board-scramble-to-comply-with-california-data-privacy-
law-11567947602 [https://perma.cc/R8Z9-7QEC]; Amazon and Your Data, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=G68RWEYX26H3ZXJT 
[https://perma.cc/MEB8-NDLW] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021); Walmart Privacy Poli-
cy, WALMART, https://corporate.walmart.com/privacy-security/walmart-privacy-policy 
[https://perma.cc/75UN-AT3N] (last updated July 1, 2020).  
33 Levi & Healow, supra note 27; De Groot, supra note 29.  
34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(E) (West 2020). 
35 Levi & Healow, supra note 27. 
2020] CLOSING THE DATA GAP 873 
market.36  An estimated $12 billion worth of personal information 
is used for advertising in California each year.37  Every industry 
exploited this data, yet California consumers had no legal 
protections.38 
Part I of this Note examines the Rosenbach case’s inter-
pretation and application of Illinois’s BIPA as well as the gaps 
left by the decision.  Part II examines how the upcoming CCPA 
addresses these issues.  Part III examines gaps that remain de-
spite the overlap between BIPA and CCPA.  Finally, Part IV 
recommends methods that courts and legislatures could use to 
promote the legislative intent behind BIPA and CCPA by filling 
gaps and extending existing protections to newly evolving tech-
nologies and threats. 
I.  BIPA PROTECTIONS AFTER ROSENBACH 
A. BIPA Cases Before Rosenbach 
Before the Rosenbach decision, Illinois courts dismissed over 
150 BIPA suits for lack of “actual injury or adverse effect,” 
meaning plaintiffs had failed to prove that they suffered a finan-
cial or other injury.39  BIPA did not explicitly mention standing, 
and the courts reasoned that the federal constitutional standing 
requirement also applied to BIPA claims.40 
 
36 Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely Activists Who Took on Silicon Valley—and 
Won, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/magazine 
/facebook-google-privacy-data.html [https://perma.cc/CEZ6-YFHW]. 
37 Lauren Feiner, California’s New Privacy Law Could Cost Companies a Total 
of $55 Billion To Get in Compliance, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://www 
.cnbc.com/2019/10/05/california-consumer-privacy-act-ccpa-could-cost-companies-55-
billion.html [https://perma.cc/5UQP-D4CS]. 
38 Brenda Stoltz, A New California Privacy Law Could Affect Every U.S. 
Business—Will You Be Ready?, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2019, 7:52 PM), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/allbusiness/2019/09/07/california-consumer-privacy-act-could-affect-your-
business/#488236cb36ac [https://perma.cc/Q26U-F3LW]; Confessore, supra note 36. 
39 Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., et al., Biometric Privacy Class Actions by the 
Numbers: Analyzing Illinois’ Hottest Class Action Trend, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP: 
WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION BLOG (June 28, 2019), https://www.workplaceclassaction 
.com/2019/06/biometric-privacy-class-actions-by-the-numbers-analyzing-illinois-hottest-
class-action-trend/ [https://perma.cc/7NVY-A82R]; Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 
2019 IL 123186, ¶ 1.  
40 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding plaintiffs 
must have “concrete and particularized” injuries to have standing in federal court). 
Injuries must be immediate and have a direct stake in the outcome of the appeal. 
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 196 (2010). A simple violation of BIPA 
was, therefore, not previously considered sufficient to create standing without 
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The first indication of changed legislative intent came when 
the Illinois Legislature rejected amendment S.B. 3053 on Janu-
ary 9, 2019.41  The amendment would have exempted from BIPA 
the gathering of biometric information collected for 
noncommercial reasons, or of information that was protected at 
least as much as other information a company stored.42 
This rejection indicated that the Illinois Legislature wanted 
to hold private companies accountable for the collected biometric 
information regardless of the purpose, profit, or level of protec-
tion.43  The declined amendment may have played a role in the 
Rosenbach court’s interpretation of the legislative intent behind 
BIPA.44  It showed that the Legislature’s focus was on protecting 
the individual, not on categorizing specific uses of biometric in-
formation.45 
Following this unsuccessful attempt to narrow BIPA, Rosen-
bach marked a shift in Illinois’s BIPA landscape; the Illinois 
Supreme Court overturned nine years of Illinois precedent by 
granting standing to individuals whose biometric information 
was collected without the required notice and consent.46  Illinois 
plaintiffs no longer needed to allege an actual injury under BIPA; 
BIPA granted consumers a say in the collection of their biometric 
information before a security breach occurred and the right to 
enforce such protections through private suits.47 
B. Procedural History of Rosenbach 
After Rosenbach filed suit, Six Flags submitted a combined 
motion seeking “dismissal of [the] action under both sections 
2-615 and 2-619 of the [Illinois] Code.”48  Six Flags asserted that 
Rosenbach lacked standing as a result of suffering no actual or 
threatened injury.49  After a hearing, the circuit court proceeded 
 
evidence of further injury. Almost all of the 173 BIPA cases were dismissed on issues 
of standing. See Maatman et al., supra note 39. 
41 See Leicht, supra note 12. 
42 S.B. 3053, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2018).  
43 Id. 
44 See Alan S. Wernick, Biometric Information—Permanent Personally Identifi-




46 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 1, 38. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. ¶ 12. 
49 Id. 
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under section 2-615 of the Code, denying the motions in part and 
dismissing claims in part with prejudice.50 
Defendants then “sought interlocutory review . . . under Illi-
nois Supreme Court Rule 308,” claiming that the case involved a 
controversial question of law.51  The circuit court held that Mrs. 
Rosenbach, on behalf of her son Alexander, had not suffered an 
actual injury through the collection of his biometric informa-
tion.52  Mrs. Rosenbach appealed.53  The appellate court granted 
review and decided that Mrs. Rosenbach was not “aggrieved” 
within the meaning of BIPA and could not pursue damages or 
injunctive relief solely based on defendant’s violation of the 
statute.54 
The appellate court reasoned that the plain meaning of 
“aggrieved” suggests that an actual injury is still necessary.55  
Using persuasive district court decisions, the court reasoned that 
the Legislature could have simply written that each “technical 
violation” was actionable, but chose instead to say “aggrieved.”56  
The Illinois Legislature, the court decided, does not act through 
inferences.57  Therefore, the appellate court refused to read strict 
liability for violations into the statute.58  In response, Rosenbach 
petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal, which 
the court granted.59 
C. The Rosenbach Court’s Reasoning 
The Supreme Court of Illinois properly used statutory 
interpretation tools, such as plain language, precedent, 
legislative intent, and legislative history, to find that “aggrieved 
by a violation” created strict liability for BIPA violations and 
created individual causes of action for improperly collected and 
stored biometric information.60  Chief Justice Karmeier utilized 
the context of BIPA’s enactment and the unique nature of 
 
50 Id. ¶ 13. 
51 Id. ¶ 14. Defendants also alleged there was “substantial ground for a differ-
ence of opinion.” Id.  
52 See id. ¶ 15. 
53 Id. ¶ 16. 
54 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 28 (quoting 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20 (West 2010)), rev’d, 2019 IL 123186.  
55 Id. ¶ 20. 
56 Id. ¶ 28. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 1, 16. 
60 Id. ¶ 21 (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20 (West 2010)). 
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biometric information to inform the court’s decision.61  However, 
the holding brushed over important policy considerations for the 
purpose of making a general conclusion that would be widely 
applicable.  
1. Textual Arguments 
Under a plain meaning analysis, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois found a meaningful variation between “aggrieved” and 
“injured.”  Since BIPA does not contain a definition of 
“aggrieved,” the court in Rosenbach applied the ordinary 
meaning doctrine, which would not require actual injury.62 
The court then examined the “settled legal meaning” of “ag-
grieved.”63  Courts generally infer that legislatures intended set-
tled legal meanings to guide the interpretation of the law.64  In 
1913, the Supreme Court of Illinois interpreted “aggrieved” to 
mean “a substantial grievance; a denial of some personal of prop-
erty right.”65  According to Glos v. People, aggrieved should be 
interpreted “in the legal sense, when a legal right is invaded.”66  
Glos’s interpretation of “aggrieved” was “repeated frequently by 
Illinois courts and was embedded in [Illinois] jurisprudence when 
[BIPA] was adopted.”67  The Rosenbach court then cited cases 
from 1943, 1958, 1973, and 2004, showing that the Legislature 
had notice of the legal interpretation of “aggrieved.”68  
Application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and the 
ordinary legal understanding showed the Legislature, therefore, 
meant for “aggrieved” to be translated differently from 
“injured.”69 
Next, the Rosenbach court looked at common dictionaries 
printed around 2008 to determine the “popularly understood 
meaning”70 of “aggrieved” at the time BIPA was enacted.  The 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary from 2006 “define[d] 
aggrieved as ‘suffering from an infringement or denial of legal 
 
61 Id. ¶ 19. 
62 Id. ¶ 29. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Glos v. People, 102 N.E. 763, 766 (Ill. 1913). 
66 Id. 
67 Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 1, 31.  
68 Id. ¶ 31.  
69 Id. ¶ 29–32. 
70 Id. ¶ 29. 
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rights.’ ”71  Black Law’s Dictionary in 2009 defined it as “having 
legal rights that are adversely affected.”72  Both of these defini-
tions from around the time of BIPA’s enactment show that the 
popular meaning of “aggrieved” related to the infringement of 
legal rights, not to actual injury.  The popular meaning of “ag-
grieved” in 2008 weighed in Rosenbach’s favor. 
Rosenbach affirmed that if the Legislature wanted to impose 
a higher burden on plaintiffs, it had to “ma[ke] that intention 
clear.”73  Using exclusio unius, the court reasoned that the Illinois 
Legislature knew how to explicitly require actual injuries, as it 
had done so in various statutes in the past.74  Past statutes had 
created a private cause of action with and without requirements 
of actual injury.75  Section 10a of the Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practice Act clearly stated that “actual 
damage” must be alleged.76  When the Legislature used 
“aggrieved” language, proof of “actual damage” was not required, 
as in the AIDS Confidentiality Act.77  These prior statutes illus-
trated clear examples where the Legislature “wanted to impose 
such . . . requirement[s] in other situations.”78  BIPA, the court 
concluded, contained “terms that parallel[ed] the AIDS Confiden-
tiality Act.”79  If the Illinois Legislature wanted courts to inter-
pret “aggrieved” to require actual injury, it should have used 
clearer language to express its intentions.80  As written, BIPA’s 
text was more similar to statutes that did not require actual 
injury.81 
The Rosenbach court determined that BIPA’s language was 
clear in requiring only aggrievement by a BIPA violation, rather 
than an actual injury.82  The court then complemented its textual 
holding with supplemental contextual support.83 
 
71 Id. ¶ 32 (quoting Aggrieved, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2006)).  
72 Id. (quoting Aggrieved, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).  
73 Id. ¶ 25. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
76 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(a) (West 2008). 
77 Doe v. Chand, 781 N.E.2d 340, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
78 Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 25. 
79 Id. ¶ 27. 
80 Id. ¶ 25. 
81 Id. ¶¶ 29–31. 
82 Id. ¶ 29. 
83 Id. ¶ 28. 
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2. Contextual Arguments 
According to the Rosenbach court, when considering the 
meaning of a word in a statute, courts should look to “the connec-
tion in which the word is used, the object or purpose of the stat-
ute, and the consequences which probably will result from the 
proposed construction.”84  The court admitted that parallel lan-
guage in the AIDS Confidentiality Act is “instructive” but “not 
dispositive.”85  Language should be interpreted in context, but 
within a relevant scope.86  After all, “[s]eparate acts with sepa-
rate purposes need not . . . define similar terms in the same 
way.”87  The Rosenbach court acknowledged that each Legislature 
could not have a complete understanding of the ways in which a 
word was used throughout all federal laws, but this did not 
invalidate BIPA’s explicit language.88 
The Rosenbach court said that the appellate court misunder-
stood the Legislature’s purpose—to prevent the compromise of 
sensitive biometric information.89  The appellate court approached 
BIPA in a “merely ‘technical’ ” manner90 and thereby misinter-
preted the preventative purpose of BIPA. 
The Illinois Supreme Court looked at legislative history for 
indications of the evil BIPA was intended to remedy.91  By 
considering the Pay By Touch bankruptcy which led to BIPA’s 
enactment, the court concluded that the Illinois Legislature saw 
violations of BIPA as a “real and significant” harm worthy of a 
remedy.92  BIPA was meant to prevent biometric information 
security breaches before they happened.  The act did this by: 
(1) “imposing safeguards,” and (2) providing “substantial poten-
tial liability” for violations.93  To meet BIPA standards, third-
party companies needed only to provide information to users 
about why and for how long their biometric identifier or biomet-
ric information was being stored and obtain their consent; there 






88 See id. 
89 Id. ¶ 34. 
90 Id. (quoting Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 23, rev’d, 
2019 IL 123186). 
91 See id. ¶ 35. 
92 Id. ¶¶ 34–35. 
93 Id. ¶ 36. 
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of biometric information.94  Due to the ease of compliance and 
important goals associated with BIPA, the Rosenbach court 
thought it more likely that the Legislature wanted violations to 
lead to a cause of action.95 
Along with simple guidelines, effective enforcement required 
plaintiffs to have standing for pure violations.  Since BIPA did 
not allow the Attorney General to bring suit, BIPA could not be 
enforced without a private right of action for violations.96  There 
were “no other enforcement mechanism[s] . . . available.”97  Re-
quiring plaintiffs to prove actual injury would mean that almost 
all suits brought by private individuals would fail for lack of 
standing.98  BIPA only imposed a strong incentive to conform to 
the simple guidelines if private rights of action were allowed for 
violations of the law.99  If the court had ruled against Rosenbach, 
there would have been no consequences for BIPA violations, and 
BIPA would have had no practical effect.100 
3. Issues Not Addressed by the Rosenbach Decision 
While the Rosenbach case was decided correctly, it did not 
address the changing technological environment.  With the expo-
nential growth of technological innovations and the dominance of 
devices in daily life, BIPA must be read broadly to, at the mini-
mum, provide a basis for future protections.  Five areas were left 
undeveloped after the Rosenbach decision: (1) the nature of the 
created rights, (2) enforcement and the remedial gap, (3) finan-
cial limitations, (4) minors’ rights, and (5) gaps in notice. 
a. The Nature of the Rights Created by BIPA 
The Rosenbach decision did not specify what kind of rights 
BIPA created.101  Logically, the right to know how one’s biometric 
information is used stems from a type of property right.  Personal 
information belongs to the individual from whom it was collected, 
 
94 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(b)(1)–(b)(3) (West 2010). 
95 Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 37.  
96 Natalie Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What U.S. Companies Need 
To Know in 2020, MINTZ, (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center 
/viewpoints/2826/2020-01-15-anatomy-biometric-laws-what-us-companies-need-know-
2020 [https://perma.cc/7TP5-MYNC]; Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 25. 
97 Id. ¶ 37. 
98 Id. ¶ 12. 
99 See id. ¶ 25. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
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and that individual should have a say in how it is stored and 
used by third parties.  The requirement of notice and implied 
consent can be seen as a license, which individuals grant to the 
third parties to use their personal information in a specified way.  
By identifying BIPA rights as property rights, the court could 
have set the stage to extend common law presumptions about 
property to personal information, facilitating BIPA’s application 
to newly advancing technologies and services. 
b. Enforcement and the Remedial Gap 
BIPA’s purpose is to discourage indiscriminate use and ex-
ploitation of personal biometric information, with hefty fines for 
each violation.102  Rosenbach was a turning point in BIPA 
enforcement, but the decision simply allows individuals suffering 
from a BIPA violation their day in court.103  As of yet, there is no 
assurance that violations will be punished.104  There has not yet 
been a substantial plaintiff victory to encourage other plaintiffs 
to shoulder the time and expense of pursuing such claims, 
although several BIPA cases are underway after the Rosenbach 
decision.105 
If a substantial plaintiff victory occurs, the next challenge for 
the court would be to make the plaintiff whole.  BIPA, as well as 
other state laws inspired by it, does not outline a method to 
estimate and remedy the damage caused by a violation.106  Even 
if a BIPA violation is punished, individuals do not have control 
over where their biometric information is stored or what will be-
come of it in the future.107  Even if the violating company were to 
pay monetary damages for its violation, there is no indication 
what the next step would be to protect the biometric information. 
Money is not necessarily the only remedy.  Courts could en-
join companies to delete the information collected in violation of 
 
102 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20 (West 2010). 
103 Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 38. 
104 See Douglas A. Darch & Jenna Neumann, BIPA After Rosenbach—A Broad Inter-
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BIPA.  Although these considerations affect the way in which 
BIPA should be read, the Rosenbach court punted this issue.108 
c. Financial Limitations 
While BIPA’s goal is admirable, its provisions do not ensure 
equal rights over personal information.109  The sale of personal 
information draws huge profits that allow larger companies to re-
duce the cost of their services.  Given the prevalent and constant-
ly evolving use of technology in the modern world, the idea of not 
agreeing to company policies is almost unthinkable; ninety-one 
percent of Americans, for example, agree to “legal terms and 
services conditions without reading them.”110  If an individual 
opts not to agree to the biometric collection terms, her only 
current options are not to use that technological service or to find 
an alternative, which would likely be more expensive.  Larger 
companies often have territorial dominance, particularly in rural 
areas; often, choosing not to agree to a company’s terms means, 
at worst, being excluded from basic services.111  Lower-income 
individuals in areas of economic distress may not have the luxury 
of choosing a more expensive service that does not require 
consumers to opt in to biometric information collection.112 
Additionally, if the entire nationwide market has similar 
collection policies—a likely scenario when data collection is so 
lucrative—then the choice not to agree to data collection in fact 
requires the decision not to engage in certain technological uses 
altogether. 
d. Minors’ Rights 
In the modern world, minors have more social media 
accounts and devices than ever before.113  Ninety-five percent of 
teens use smartphones, and forty-five percent spend most of their 
 
108 See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186. 
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day online.114  With this privilege comes many dangers.  The law 
generally presumes that minors are less able to recognize such 
dangers and concerns than adults, leading to more paternal 
protections for minors.115  Given the quick rise of technologies 
that use biometric information, minors have been well-educated 
on the dangers of sharing information with strangers online; 
however, they are less informed and less concerned about the 
long-term consequences of personal data breaches.116 
BIPA does not require additional consent from parents or 
guardians before the personal data of minors is collected.  The 
Rosenbach decision briefly mentioned the issue of Alexander’s 
minority,117 but did not address concerns stemming from it; while 
the court could not judicially create new provisions of BIPA, 
explicit references to minors’ rights or a statement of concern 
focused at the legislature could have provoked an update or 
revision of an important aspect of BIPA rights.  The federal Fam-
ily Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FEPA”), for example, 
allows parents to “opt out of the disclosure of directory 
information” with third parties.118  Educational information 
changes every few years, whereas biometric information is 
forever.119  Children do not grow out of their collected biometric 
information in the same way that they outgrow their school 
systems.120  Protections similar to FEPA should apply to infor-
mation that has more substantial long-lasting implications 
regarding a minor’s privacy. 
II.  CCPA’S BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PROTECTIONS 
CCPA focuses on biometric information collected for commer-
cial purposes.121  Biometric information is covered under CCPA’s 
broader definition of personal information used “to build a profile 
about a consumer,” which is covered under “[b]usiness pur-
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pose.”122  Biometric information that is not collected “in the ordi-
nary course of business” is not covered by CCPA.123  
Under CCPA, consumers must receive notice of any changes 
to company policy within the past twelve months.124  Companies 
must provide consumers with “clear and conspicuous” methods of 
contacting companies to request that they not sell the individ-
ual’s data.125  This strict formality is loosened for opt-outs; an 
authorized third person can opt out on the consumer’s behalf.126 
Companies are responsible not only for the biometric infor-
mation they store, but also for any such information that they 
disseminate to other companies.127  Upon a deletion request, the 
company must delete the personal information and “direct any 
service providers to delete” the information.128  CCPA, therefore, 
impliedly requires companies to track whom they give personal 
information to, and provide third parties with notice when the 
consumer changes any authorization, unless an exception ap-
plies.129 
The preamble of CCPA eliminates the standing problem 
addressed in Rosenbach by creating causes of action for vio-
lations.130  Whereas BIPA cases have only recently started multi-
plying since the Rosenbach decision,131 CCPA will hopefully 
bypass the slow growth of private suits by explicitly granting 
standing based on certain types of violations.  The Attorney Gen-
eral may bring suit if companies have not cured violations within 
30 days, but an individual may bring suit only for violations “in 
connection with certain unauthorized access and exfiltration, 
theft, or disclosure of . . . nonencrypted or nonredacted personal 
information.”132  Penalties mimic the high rates from BIPA.133 
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Businesses cannot discriminate against consumers who exer-
cise their CCPA rights, but they may “[c]harg[e] different prices 
or rates” and may “[p]rovid[e] a different level or quality of goods 
or services” as long as “that difference is reasonably related to 
the value provided . . . by the consumer’s data.”134  Companies 
can offer financial incentives to encourage individuals to agree to 
biometric information collection, as long as the terms are clear.135 
CCPA does not stop companies from collecting biometric in-
formation from minors younger than sixteen; rather, it only stops 
them from selling it without a parent or guardian’s affirmative 
authorization.136  Actual knowledge of a consumer’s age is im-
puted, so companies cannot use willful blindness as a defense.137 
If a consumer opts out, the company must wait at least a 
year before asking for authorization for the sale of the personal 
information again.138  A company is only obligated to comply with 
a request from an individual for the current status of the com-
pany’s policy on collected data twice a year.139  To further protect 
the biometric information, businesses must take reasonable steps 
to determine whether the request is a “verifiable consumer 
request.”140 
Although 500,000 businesses in the United States are affect-
ed by CCPA, a 2019 survey said “only 8% of businesses [were] 
prepared” for its enactment.141  CCPA does not specify enforce-
ment.142  Companies were, therefore, waiting to see how it would 
be enforced before weighing “the cost of compliance against the 
risk and cost of being fined.”143 
A survey found that most businesses were “aware (20%) or 
[were] educating themselves (58%) about CCPA,” while “22% did 
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not know about it.”144  Another report estimates that the cost of 
initial compliance may reach $55 billion.145  These costs may have 
been exaggerated since many California businesses recently had 
to comply with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”).146  Nonetheless, many companies were “scrambling to 
build [the] tools” to comply with the CCPA.147  They saw expen-
sive compliance as a long-term business decision.148  Smaller 
firms were expected to be disproportionately affected by CCPA, 
just as with the GDPR.149 
III.  GAPS BETWEEN BIPA AND CCPA 
This Part will compare BIPA and CCPA to show how the two 
overlap regarding the questions left unanswered in Rosenbach.  
CCPA expands on, but does not fully cover, the gaps remaining 
after the Rosenbach decision: (1) the nature of the created 
rights, (2) the remedial gap, (3) financial limitations, (4) minors’ 
rights, and (5) gaps in notice. 
A. The Nature of the Created Rights 
Neither BIPA nor CCPA specifically addresses the nature of 
the created rights.150  Without a clear indication of the type of 
right, future courts will struggle with how to promote BIPA’s and 
CCPA’s goals.  Given the context in which both laws were enact-
ed, the laws filled the void of consumer vulnerability to ensure 
sufficient protections in the future.151  If these rights were 
specified as property rights, future courts could apply existing 
common law to evolving and unanticipated situations. 
While courts have traditionally been reluctant to expand 
property rights to human bodies, they should not have the same 
hesitation about applying these rights to biometric information.  
In the modern world, biometric information is an alienable re-
source that individuals can use to facilitate their lives.152 
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CCPA expanded on BIPA’s focus on the continued interest 
consumers have in their collected biometric information by re-
quiring notice of updated company policy and allowing con-
sumers to change their minds about how their biometric 
information is used.153 
B. Enforcement and the Remedial Gap 
Both BIPA and CCPA were enacted to prevent security 
breaches that compromise personal information, yet both dis-
regard what happens to that information once compromised by 
failing to provide concrete methods to deal with such dangers.154  
CCPA’s high penalties, like BIPA’s, are meant to discourage 
negligent storage of personal information, not to compensate the 
individual for the breach.155  Penalties will not restore control of 
someone’s biometric information.  In fact, CCPA specifies that 
any civil penalties recovered by the Attorney General will offset 
the cost of the trial.156  Private enforcement is only available for a 
limited set of cases involving “unauthorized access and exfiltra-
tion, theft, or disclosure of a consumer’s . . . personal informa-
tion.”157  In an environment where defenses are reactive to 
breaches, such measures are unlikely to be particularly effective 
in promoting protection.158 
Another concern is that CCPA does not seem to cover encoded 
or encrypted personal information.159  Issues of pseudonymized, 
deidentified, and reidentified information are only addressed 
relating to research.160  Only “nonencrypted and nonredacted per-
sonal information” is protected from “unauthorized access and 
exfiltration, theft, or disclosure” resulting from the business’ 
violation of the duty of care.161  This difference creates a distinc-
tion that would not be otherwise inferred and exhibits the 
legislature’s assumption that encrypted information is safe from 
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abuse or misuse.162  BIPA also underestimated the capabilities of 
hackers and modern computers.163  Information encrypted or pro-
tected under current industry standards is not safe from hackers, 
who do not need to compromise the encryption formula in order 
to gain access to encrypted information.164  Instead, they can 
simply compromise computers containing the encryption “key,” 
allowing them to decrypt any information protected by that 
encryption.165 
Additionally, there may be a disconnect between protective 
schemes, like BIPA’s private enforcement and CCPA’s mixed 
private-and-public enforcement scheme.  While CCPA protections 
will apply to Illinois citizens if companies choose uniform nation-
wide application, Illinois state courts will limit suits to BIPA 
violations.166 
C. Financial Limitations 
Unlike BIPA, CCPA addresses concerns of financial pressure 
by prohibiting service discrimination based on opting out of a 
company’s personal information collection policies.167  CCPA at-
tempted to cover this gap by prohibiting businesses from discrim-
inating against consumers who opted-out of the data collection 
policy.168  While this appears to create alternatives, other CCPA 
provisions could be read to negate this important prohibition.169  
The following section states that businesses may charge consum-
ers different prices or rates “if that difference is reasonably 
related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s 
data.”170  As previously stated, the sale of private information 
provides huge value for companies.  While it is reasonable to 
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allow companies to charge more when they make less profit on a 
consumer’s use of their service, the lack of a measurable stan-
dard negates the purpose of an alternative.  If consumers opt out 
of the collection policy, their use of the service will be different 
from consumers who opt in, as they will not have access to the 
same features and will be charged more to compensate the 
company for the lack of external profit from the sale of their 
personal information.  Two of the requirements for nondiscrimi-
nation will therefore necessarily be broken by this different treat-
ment: not charging different rates and not providing different 
levels of service.171  CPPA has not provided a measurable stan-
dard to evaluate the reasonability of alternative services.172 
BIPA did not address the necessity of alternatives, but CCPA 
has not succeeded in plugging the gap.173  There is still room for 
discrimination, which will likely mean that lower income 
individuals will be incentivized to surrender their privacy rights. 
D. Minors’ Rights 
Given the prevalence of technology in daily life, minors are 
more vulnerable than ever when their personal information is 
surrendered to a company for reasons that they do not fully 
understand.174  Most minors do not think about cybersecurity or 
privacy when they use new technologies;175 rather, they are 
concerned about following popular trends without awareness or 
consideration of the long-term ramifications of their choices.176 
While CCPA—unlike BIPA—addresses minors’ rights, it 
fails to address what notice or authorization is required of the 
minor once he or she reaches maturity.177  Presumably, the indi-
vidual on file will be the parent or guardian.  Together with 
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BIPA’s failure to mention minors’ rights, this leaves a significant 
gap in the protection of the personal information of minors.178 
E. Gaps in Notice 
While the overall idea of notice in CCPA is good, it creates a 
loophole period during which companies could sell personal infor-
mation before individuals are made aware of any policy 
changes.179  If a consumer checked the policy before the change, 
they would not know to use their full rights under CCPA until it 
was too late to prevent the sale.  Companies could foreseeably 
deprive a consumer of any cause of action through such a 
technicality.  BIPA would not cover this behavior either; it only 
requires notice of the policy at the time the company collects the 
personal information.180 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO FILL 
GAPS BETWEEN BIPA AND CCPA 
CCPA does not fully close the gaps in BIPA left by the 
Rosenbach decision.  CCPA’s language was broadened slightly by 
Assembly Bill 713 in September 2020,181 but even further 
specification beyond the current proposal would help both courts 
and consumers.  Although CCPA and BIPA in conjunction pro-
vide citizens with expanded protections in the technological era, 
important issues remain unanswered. 
Increased data protection has become particularly important 
as data privacy issues have begun to damage American business 
practices abroad.  The European Union’s top court recently ruled 
that European data was not adequately protected from govern-
ment surveillance in the United States.182  In comparison with 
Europe’s GDPR, American data privacy laws remain scattered 
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and rare.  The previous data protection compromise between 
American and European companies, called the “Privacy Shield,” 
was found to be too lax for the EU’s more exacting data 
protection standards.183 
The COVID-19 pandemic has also brought the gap in per-
sonal information data security to the forefront of politics.  As 
employers struggle to screen employees per state and federal 
health and workplace regulations, local governments are rushing 
to provide data protection for any personal, medical, or contact-
tracing data collected.  Data collection is also starting to be seen 
as a new frontier to raise public funds; in New York, a bill was 
recently proposed that would tax data collection to cover COVID-
19 expenses.184  The pandemic has reignited hopes for a federal 
data protection bill called the COVID Consumer Data Protection 
Act, which was proposed in May 2020 and continues to languish 
before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation.185 
States like Illinois should pass language similar to CCPA to 
provide their citizens with causes of action for the de facto 
nationwide protections of CCPA.  Hopefully, states can use Cali-
fornia as a model to update their own laws and to continue 
improving on CCPA’s provisions. 
Specifically identifying the nature of the created rights will 
strengthen BIPA’s and CCPA’s protective purposes.  Given indi-
viduals’ continued interests in their immutable biometric infor-
mation, courts could interpret consent to collect, store, or use 
biometric information as a kind of lease.  Both parties benefit 
from the collection; companies receive financial benefit, while 
consumers receive more secure and efficient service.  Specific 
labeling of the collection, storage, and use of biometric informa-
tion as a lease would allow courts to adapt these statutes to 
evolving technologies through analogy to existing common law 
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and case law concerning leases.  Not only would this label make 
interpretation simpler for courts, but it would also emphasize 
that the collected information still fundamentally belongs to the 
individual rather than the company.  It would eradicate the 
possibility that sensitive biometric information could be sold as 
assets of a bankrupt company. 
If biometric information storage were subject to a lease, the 
gap in notice would be simpler to fill.  The more specific forms 
and terms used in lease agreements could be mimicked in col-
lection notices.  By requiring additional language before com-
panies shared biometric information, legislatures could preempt 
market transformation rather than constantly reacting with 
legislation when new problems arise in the evolving technology 
market.  Consumers would then have notice when their biometric 
information is passed to other entities, regardless of prior 
consent to the original collector, and would remain aware of who 
possessed their biometric information.  Consumers would have 
more power to enforce the protection of their sensitive, 
immutable information.  
To ensure compliance, BIPA and CCPA must broaden 
private enforcement actions or expand current departmental 
purposes to monitor biometric information collection.  CCPA en-
courages limited forms of private enforcement that will curb 
particularly egregious behavior; other violations remain at the 
Attorney General’s discretion.186  Collection of penalties incen-
tivizes the Attorney General to pursue such cases, but each 
undertaking would still cost substantial amounts of money and 
time.187  Most likely, the Attorney General will pursue larger 
companies, whose violations would produce higher penalties; 
violations by smaller companies, while no less damaging for 
individual consumers than larger violations, could escape prose-
cution.  The low percentage of companies preparing to comply 
illustrates that many are waiting to see how strict enforcement 
will be before complying. 
New technologies could eventually be used to fill these gaps.  
The advent of quantum computers provides a tantalizing option; 
a sophisticated, rare, and expensive new technology could reduce 
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the threat of hacks, but it will be years before such technology 
becomes effective.188 
Until then, statutory protections must be updated to protect 
biometric information vulnerable to hackers who seize encryption 
keys.189  BIPA and CCPA should be amended to encourage com-
panies to use protective measures beyond what is required for 
less sensitive information.  Protective requirements should be 
expanded to cover computers and devices that encrypt and 
decrypt biometric information, or the legislatures should pass 
separate, broader data privacy restrictions upon which BIPA and 
CCPA can rely. 
Legislatures should also set a measurable standard for ac-
ceptable alternatives for individuals who opt out of such col-
lection.  The biometric information market from each previous 
year could provide a measurable standard to determine the fi-
nancial benefit such information provides.  Without standards, 
courts cannot ensure that alternatives to opting in are not false 
choices that incentivize lower-income individuals to surrender 
their biometric information privacy rights for financial reasons. 
Legislatures should also ensure that, upon maturity, minors 
receive full information about how their guardians disseminated 
their biometric information.  Companies storing a former minor’s 
biometric information should be required to contact either the 
individual or her guardian to inform her, or them, of policies and 
receive updated consent.  Otherwise, if a minor’s legal guardian 
can decide on the use of the minor’s biometric information, the 
minor may not know or remember who holds her biometric 
information or how it is stored and protected. 
If these recommendations had been in place in 2014, Six 
Flags’ website would have informed Stacey Rosenbach about how 
Alexander’s biometric information would be collected for the 
season pass.  Mrs. Rosenbach could have chosen to buy Alex-
ander a one-time ticket instead.  At Six Flags, Alexander would 
not have been able to surrender his biometric information with-
out notice to Mrs. Rosenbach about why and how the information 
would be used.  Alexander’s biometric information could not have 
been collected without Mrs. Rosenbach’s consent. 
 
188 Adrian Cho, Cryptographers Scramble To Protect the Internet from Attacks 
Armed with Quantum Computers, SCI. MAG. (Aug. 21, 2019, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/08/cryptographers-scramble-protect-internet-
hackers-quantum-computers [https://perma.cc/S3WE-WVMU]. 
189 See id. 
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If Six Flags chose to sell or share Alexander’s biometric 
information with other companies, Mrs. Rosenbach would be 
updated and allowed to opt out of new uses not previously dis-
closed.  She would have been given an option to continue compa-
rable services measured relative to the interrupted financial 
benefit Six Flags failed to acquire from Alexander’s biometric 
information.  If evolving technology or increasingly sophisticated 
hacks worried the Rosenbachs, they could have contacted Six 
Flags to have the information deleted.  If over the years Alex-
ander or Mrs. Rosenbach forgot about Alexander’s thumb scan, 
Six Flags would still have contacted Alexander upon maturity 
and asked for updated consent.  Alexander could then have chosen 
whether or not he wanted Six Flags to retain his biometric infor-
mation.  With these recommendations in place, the Rosenbachs 
would have a substantially more central role in the protection of 
Alexander’s biometric information; they would not have been left 
wondering what was happening to Alexander’s immutable bio-
metric information and who had access to it. 
